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Abstract 
This paper develops a model of North-South quality-ladder growth and for-
eign direct investment, and uses this model to examine how local content require-
ment by the Southern government affects innovation and welfare within a dy-
namic general equilibrium model. This paper shows that the relaxation of the lo-
cal content requirement may result in higher prices of consumable goods, but 
this simultaneously promotes innovative activities in the North, which in turn ac-
celerates the improvement of goods' qualities. This paper characterizes the condi-
tion· under which the latter effect overcomes the former to improve welfare in 
both.countries. 
Keywords: foreign direct investment; endogenous innovation; local content re-
quirement; quality-ladder growth. 
JEL classfication: F21; F43; 032; 033 
1. Introduction 
Recently, under pressure from GATT/WTO, governments in developing countries 
have been obliged to eliminate a range of restrictions on foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Specifically, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (the 
TRIMs agreement) under the Uruguay Round, in order to facilitate investment, pro-
hibits some TRIMs including local content requirement (LCR) as a violation of 
GATT Art. III:4. However, it is unlikely that the TRIMs agreement has been 
strictly enforced. For example, although Art. V:2 of the TRIMs agreement states 
that developing countries were given a transition period of five years to start to imple-
ment their TRIMs obligations, 10 developing countries notified the WTO Council for 
Trade in Goods (CTG) of their TRIMs still to be eliminated, and submitted their re-
quests to extend the transition period. As a result of the debate, the CTG decided to ac-
cept the requests from the countries for an extension of the deadline-'> Furthermore, 
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1) This decision is contained in Section 6.1 of "Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns" 
of the WTO's 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha as the following text: (the TRIMs agree-
ment) "[t]akes note of actions taken by the Council for Trade in Goods in regard to re-
quests from some developing country-members for the extension of the five-year transi-
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at the WTO's 2005 Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong (China), it was argued that 
for less developed countries, the deadline shall be extended by the CTG (WTO, 2005). 
These facts teach us that elimination of TRIMs seems to be one of its long-term objec-
tives.2l 
Although the massive and rapid increase in FDI is one of the most striking phe-
nomena, economic evaluations of LCR are surprisingly limited. Several researchers 
considered LCR in the context of static international trade theory. Under perfectly 
competitive markets for both final- and intermediate goods, Grossman (1981) system-
atically analyzed the effects of LCR on resource allocation, and this research was ex-
tended to the model of imperfect competition in intermediate goods markets (e.g., 
Krishna and Itoh, 1988) and final goods markets (e.g., Davidson et al., 1985; Lopez-de-
Silanes et a!., 1996). However, these papers did not investigate any welfare implica-
tions: i.e., they did not judge whether or not the developing countries should relax 
LCR. Furthermore, in these studies foreign firms' location choice is not introduced. 
Lahiri and Ono (1998), in contrast, tackled this problem in a two-country framework 
of Cournot oligopoly. They showed that the optimal LCR policy depends on the num-
ber of firms in the host country and the cost gap between firms in the host country 
and foreign country, as well as the endogenously determined number of foreign 
firms engaging in FDI. 
Although the above literature gives important policy implications, it may over-
look the role of FDI in technology transfer from developed- to developing countries. 
Using a cross-country regression involving 69 developing countries, Borensztein et 
a!. (1998) emphasized that FDI by firms in developed countries is an important vehi-
cle for the transfer of technology. They showed that FDI may contribute to growth 
relatively more than domestic investment in developing countries, unless the stock 
of human capital in the host country is sufficiently low. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, Helpman (1993, Sec. 4) and Lai (1998) respectively constructed North-South vari-
ety expansion models. of exogenous and endogenous innovation, in both of which· a 
change in the Southern government's IPR policy affects the Northern firms' FDI. 
By formulating North-South quality-ladder models, Glass and Saggi (2002), Glass 
and Wu (2007) and Futagami et a!. (2009) also investigated the same topics-'' Because 
tional period provided for in Article 5.2 of Agreement of Trade-related Investment Meas-
ures." (WTO, 2001). According tO UNCTAD {2007), in consequence, an extension of the transi-
tion period was granted until the end of December 2003 for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Ma-
laysia, Pakistan, Romania and Thailand, and until the end of June 2003 for the Philippines, 
on condition that these countries submit elimination plans and undergo status reviews. 
2) Furthermore, under regional trade agreements such as the EU or NAFTA, the so-called 
"Rules of Origin" work in a similar way to the LCR. As Veloso (2006) reported, in the automo-
bile industry, for example, content requirements in NAFTA account for 62.5% of compo-
nent value. In the Mercosur and European regions, this value is 60%, while it is 45% in the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
3) Among others, Futagami et al. (2009) analytically investigated the effects of strengthen-
ing patent protection in the South on welfare in the North and the South, and showed that 
strengthening patent protection in the South can be Pareto-improving. 
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none of these studies has explored the implications of FDI -deterring policies such as 
LCR for innovation and technology transfer through FDI or welfare, these recent con-
tributions motivate us to clarify the effects of LCR in a dynamic framework. The pur-
pose of this paper is to examine analytically how growth and welfare are affected 
by LCR in a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
This paper develops a model of North-South quality-ladder growth, where FDI 
is determined by firms' endogenous location choice of their assembly plants. Follow-
ing most related studies, there is one primary factor, labor, in each country and the 
Southern labor is cheaper than the Northern labor. In the presented model, labor is 
used for production of both a single intermediate input and final goods. Thus, the fi-
nal goods firms produce their output by using the input and labor. Following 
Grossman et al. (2006), we can interpret the latter use of labor as assembly activi-
ties. In order to examine the effects of LCR, this paper considers the situation 
where the intermediate input is cheaper in the North than in the South, which may 
be realistic as long .as we focus on the developing countries that resist complying 
with the TRIMs agreement.4l Because the final goods firms can choose the location 
of their assembly plants, if LCR were not imposed by the Southern government, 
they could choose the most profitable production process for themselves: e.g., they lo-
cate their plants in the South, import the input from the North and use the South-
ern labor for assembling. However, the Southern government imposes LCR on for-
eign firms such that the firms in the North that are shifting their plants to the 
South must buy at least a fixed proportion of total demand for the intermediate in-
put from the local market: i.e., the Southern market. Obviously, this makes FDI less 
profitable for the Northern firms. Thus, as expected in reality, a relaxation of LCR 
triggers Northern firms' FDI in this model. 
In this framework, the paper firstly shows that the relaxation of LCR by the 
Southern government promotes innovation activities in the North, but simUltane-
ously weakens the domestic intermediate input sector. Then, from a positive point of 
view, this result seemingly suggests that there is a conflict between the Northern 
and Southern governments concerning whether or not to relax and/or abolish LCR. 
The Northern government, in order to promote domestic innovation activities, 
wants to continue the process of investment liberalization, whereas the Southern gov-
ernment wants to protect domestic industry that otherwise will suffer a decline as a 
direct result of abolishment of LCR. However, from a normative point of view, the 
welfare analysis in this paper shows the possibility of both countries agreeing to re-
lax LCR. 
4) Needless to say, from a global point of view, now many firms in developed countries volun-
tarily olltsource the production of intermediate goods to firms in developing countries: e.g., 
Chinese and Taiwanese firms. In order to focus on the role of LCR as an FDI barrier for devel-
oped countries and its implication for growth, this Paper does not address the firms' volun-
tary outsourcing strategies, as Antr8.s and Helpman (2004)' did. 
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The welfare effects of reducing the LCR consists of thr~e parts: the growth ef-
fect, the price effect and the income effect. First, as stated above, reduction of LCR 
promotes innovation acti~ities in the North, bringing about improving consumption 
qualities in the future. The second and third effects arise from a change in the 
wages in both countries. Because of an increase ~n R&D investment, the. probability 
for leader .firms to be overtaken by new firms rises. This makes the stock value of 
fir):I1s lower, which in turn makes the wage rate lower in the North through the free 
entry /exit condition for inpovatic;m _activities. This implies that the income effect is 
negative for the Northern consumers. However, because of the reduction in LCR, 
FDI becomes more profitable and hence the wage rate in the South relative to that 
in the North increases. On the one hand, this places upward pressure on the labor in-
come in the South. On the other hand, this may make the marginal cost of follower 
firms incre~se, wh.ich is transmitted to a leader firm's charging price through its 
limit pricing strateg)!". Thus, t)le price effect and the income effect combine to be nega-
tive for the Northern consumers, but to be generally ambiguous for the Southern con; 
sumers. Under free trade, however, the con~umers in both countries can equally en-
joy the growth . effect. This paper analytically characterizes the conditions under 
which the first growth .effect outweighs the other two possible negative effects and 
hence reducing the LCR is Pareto improving. 
T)le remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the 
m.odel. Section 3 characterizes the equiliqrium of the economy. Section 4 examines 
the effects of LCR. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
Consider a world that consists of two countries, called the North (denoted by N) and 
the South (denoted by S). The population size in country i E {N, S) is given by L,, 
and .households are not mobile between the two countries .. The basic structure fol-
lows a standard quality-ladder growth model (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991, 
Ch. 4): there is a continuum of industries with unit mass, and within each industry 
there are many _goods differentiated by their qualities. The allocation of labor re-
sources to innovative a,ctivities can push forward the quality frontier. As in mal?-y ex-
isting studies, the highest quality can be invented only in the North, and thus only 
the Northern labor is devoted to .innovation activities. 
The final goods are produced from labor and an intermediate input (e.g., a ma; 
chine- and electronic component), and the input is produced from only labor under con-
stant re_turns to scale technology and perfect competition. Although the firms can 
shift their production bases from the North to the South instantaneously without 
any set-up cost, the Southern government imposes an LCR on foreign firms such 
that the firms in the North that are shifting their plants to the South must buy at 
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least" E [0, I] X 100% percent of total demand for the intermediate input from the 
local market: Le., the Southern market. 
2.1 Households 
The lifetime utility of the representative consumer living in i E {N, S) is defined as: 
U, = J,~ exp( -pt)ln u1,1dt, (I) 
where p > 0 is the constant subjective discount rate, and ui,t is the instantaneous util-
ity, being specified as: 
In u11 = r,'ln[ I; (A)mx11 (m, j)]dj, 
' Jn mEflt,(j) ' ( 2) 
where x,)m, j) demotes the.demand for goodj of quality mat date t. Following the ex· 
isting literature, I describe the index of quality as the infinitely countable number, 
m E flt',c = {I, 2, 3, · ... ,}, and specify the quality m as Am for any industry j E [0, I], 
where A is assumed to be greater than unity. Thus, the degree of quality increment 
is identically given by A for all industries. The consumer's intertemporal budget con-
straint is:. 
A1, 0+Hi.o+}~~ A 1,'1 exp(- J,' i',dr) = J,~ E,,, exp( -J,' r,dr )dt, ( 3) 
together with the no-Ponzi-game condition: lim 1 ..... =Au exp(- fo 1 r,dr) ;;;:: 0, the 
equality of which will be shown to hold later. In Eq. (3), A 1,0 and H 1•0 stand for the con-
sumer's financial- and human wealth, respectively, the latter of which is given by: 
H1•0 = f,~, w,,, exp(- J,' r,dr )dt, ( 4) 
where· 'w, is the wage rate in country i. In Eq. (3), the term E,,, represents the con-
sumer's total expenditu~e over all goods as·follows: 
E,"·=J;t,,.E~.Cil p,(m, j)xJm, j) ]aj, ( 5) 
where j),(m; J) ·is the price of good j of quality m. 
As· is''weli established, the consumer's maximization problem can be· broken 
down into the following two steps. In the first stage, the representative consumer de-
termin9s th~- ti~8 profile of his/her expenditure Ei.t ·across time so as to maximize 
the lifetime utility (1) subject to Eq. (3). In the second stage, at each point in time, 
he/~he .allocates his/her expenditure Eu across industries, so as to maximize uu 
given in Eq. (2) subject to Eq. (5). Let m,(j) denote the value of m for which the quality-
adjusted consumer price of good j is the lowest: i.e., m,(j) = arg minm {p,(m, j)/Am: 
mE 17L,(j)}. Then, i,n the final step, the consumer allocates the demand for good 
j E [0, I] across quality levels as follows: 
{ 
E, ( '· ') if m = m,(j), 
x,,,(m, j) = ·
0
P, m, J ( 6) 
otherwise. 
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Then, in the first step, from his/her intertemporal optimization, the consumer 
allocates the expenditure across time according to the following Euler equation 
and the transversality condition: E1,1/Eu = 'ft-p and lim 1----.,.,Au exp(- fo1 rrdr) = 0. 
Throughout the paper, the expenditure aggregated over the North and the South is 
taken as the numeraire such that LNEN,t+ L5E5.1 = 1 V t ?: 0, which is combined with 
the Euler equation to make the interest rate equal the subjective discount rate: r, = 
p'lt?: 0. 
2.2 Firms 
2.2.1 Production 
The intermediate input is assumed to be competitively supplied. In country i E {N, S}, 
e, units of labor are employed to produce one unit of input. Let q, and z, respectively 
denote the price and supply of the input in country i. Then, the profit maximization 
yields the following set of first order conditions: 
( 7) 
Eq. {7) says that perfect competition results in the component firms in country i earn-
ing zero profit if the component is produced there, which will be shown below to 
hold true in both countries because of the LCR. Hereafter, the value of eN is normal-
ized to unity without any loss of generality: 
eN= 1, es =e. 
Turning to the final goods sector, in each industry the firms are separated into 
two types by their quality of products: a leader firm and follower firms. A firm is 
called a leader firm if it has the ability to produce its product at the level of cur-
rently available highest quality. Otherwise, it belongs to follower firms: Because the 
innovative activities occur only in the North in this paper, the leader firms have 
been born in the North. In this model, however, the firms can select their location of 
production without any cost. Throughout the paper, as in related studies, it is as-
sumed that w5 :": wN holds in equilibrium. This implies that the firm engaging in 
FDI can use Southern labor, which is cheaper than Northern labor-'l 
On the other hand, the Southern government imposes LCR such that the leader 
firms shifting their location to the South must buy at least "X 100% percent of to-
tal demand for the intermediate input from the Southern market. Here it is as-
sumed that e is assumed to be large enough that wN :": ew5: that is, qN :": q 5 holds in 
equilibrium.6> Combining this assumption and the aforementioned one .. ws S wN, we 
5) The assumption that the wage rate is cheaper in the South is made also in most related 
studies that construct dynamic general equilibrium models of North.South technology trans-
fers riot only via FDI, but also licensing (e.g., Yang and Maskus, 2001; Tanaka et al., 2007). 
· 6) This assumption is made simply because if qN > q5 , all firms would voluntarily buy the com-
ponent from the Southern market irrespective of LCR. The assumption that the input is 
more expensive in the host country is widely used in a large body of literature that studies 
LCR. 
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focus on the following case: 
1/e :5: w :5: 1; w = w5/wn. 
Accordingly, e > 1 is assumed. This implies that as long as this inequality holds, 
the firms engaging in FDI would prefer to use the intermediate input made in the 
North, but the firms must purchase the intermediate input from the local supplier 
at a proportion of "X 100%. Then, for the firms engaging in FDI, the cost to buy z 
units of the intermediate input becomes qFz, where: 
( 8) 
the equality of which holds true when" ~ 0. Thus, because of LCR, the firms engag-
ing in FDI face a higher input price in compensation for enjoying the cheaper labor 
cost in the South. The term i<(q5-qN) in Eq. (8) captures this effect and this can be 
viewed as the cost of FDI. Note that it is a general property of LCR that it provides 
neither government revenue (as a tariff would) nor quota rents.7l 
The production technology is given by j(z, l), where z and l respectively are the 
demand for the input and that for labor. As in Grossman et al. (2006), we can inter-
pret this use of labor as assembly activities." The function f is assumed to be increas-
ing, concave, twice differentiable and linearly homogenous. Then, the unit cost of a 
leader firm in the North, denoted by eN, is given by Cn ~ c(qN, Wn), where c(qN, Wn) 
= min'~·'" (qna~+wnat: 1 ~ f(a~, at)). The fmi.ction c( ·, ·) satisfies increasing, 
concave, twice differentiable and linearly homogenous. a~ and at respectively rep~e­
sent :a Northern leader's demand for the input and labor per unit of output. In the 
same way, the unit cost of a leader firm engaging in FDI, denoted by Cp, is given by 
cF = c(qF• Ws), where c(qF, Ws) =min a~,a~{qFa~+wsa~: 1 =/(a~. a~)}. a~ and a~ 
respectively represent the demand for the input and labor per unit of output by a 
leader firm engaging in FDI.91 
Now we are in a .position to explain the leader firms' pricing behaviors. Follow-
ing Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 4), it is assumed that all firms engage in 
price competition within each industry j, and that at each point in time, manufactur-
ing procedures of the second highest quality are in the public domain for all fol-
lower firms to be able to produce without any innovative activities. Then, in each in-
dustry, the leader firm chooses a limit price such that it just keeps its rivals, who 
7) As is apparent from Eq. (8), this p~per defines LCR in physical terms. Grossman (1981) dis-
tinguishes between LQR defined in physical terms and that defined in v8.lue terms to investi-
gate their different impacts on the intermediat~ goods sector. In order to obtain tractabil-
ity of analysis, this paper uses LCR defined in physical terms. 
8) For simplicity, this paper does not assume any heterogeneity in firms' productivity level, 
as Grossman et al. (2006) did. 
9) More formally, the firms engaging in FDI minimize their unit cost, qNaff+q5a~5+w5a~. 
subject to 1 = f(a~, a~) and af.,5 ;;:::: tca~, where aff and af.,5 respectively denote demand for the 
Northern-made input and that for the SoUthern-made input. An LCR constraint is iiven by 
a~5 ;:::: tCaf.,. Because qN :=:;; q5, this constrairit is always binding, aZf = tCaf., holds arid thus the 
unit cost of firms engaging in FDI is given by c(qp, w5 ). 
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are able to manufacture the product that is one step behind on the quality ladder, 
from earning a positive profit from production. Let PN and p, respectively denote 
the price charged by the leader firm when it stays in the North. and when it engages 
in FDL Fro;;., Eq. (6), it. is found that the leader firm, irrespective of its.location 
Choice, chooseS a price equal.to the quality increment, i, tim~s its ~eare~t ri~al's mar-
ginal cost in order to monopoli~e 'its ind~stry. Then, wh~ is. the __ nearest rival? 
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the Southern government imposes LCR in 
a discriminated manner. More specifically,···the Southern government imposes LCR 
only on firms engaging in FDL Therefore, there are potentially three kinds of follow-
ers: the Northern followers, FDI followers and the Southern followers, whose unit 
cost functions are respectively _given by eN, Cp and c8 ~ c(qN, w8). Because·we focus 
op. the case that Ws ,; wN and qN,; q,, it is readily found that Cs ,; eN and Cs ,; c,. 
Tjms, the Southern followers are always the nearest riva:l. In consequence, in any in-
dustry j, the leader firm squeezes out its follower firms by charging the following 
limit- price: 
· PN= p, = Aes 
= X¢(w)wN; ¢(w) = c(1, w). (g) 
Using Eqs. (6) and (9) and the normalization LNEN+ LsEs = 1, the leader firm's out-
put is given by 1/ ;tc5 . Then, it ls readily found that' the \nst,;_,taneous profit of 
firms stayin-g in the North is: 
1 c(qN, wN) 
nN= (;\c5 ~cN) Acs = 1 ~¢(w)w',' 
imd that of firms engaging in FDI is: 
· nj, = CAc,:-c;;):.,!-- = 1 
ACs 
c(q,, 11Jsl. 
;t¢(w)wN' 
(10) ' 
(11) 
Finally, using Shepherd's lemma, the first condition of Eq. (7) with equality, 
and Eq.,(8): 
at= c,(l, 1) 
. at= c,(l, 1) 
~~ = a~(w) = c; (1, t(w)) 
a~= a~(w) = c2(1. t(w)); t(w) = w/[(1-IC) +!COw] :5: w, 
where c, (.' . ) (resp. c,(.' . )) is the partial derivative ofc( .• . ) with respect to the 
first (resp. second) argument .. For these .derivations, the fa:ct that the f~nction 
c.C ·, ·) is homogenous of degree zero is also utilized, 
2.2.2 R&D- and FDI activities 
Now, we can turn to the R&D activities in the economy. It is assumed that if a North-
ern follower in an industry devotes a~i units of Northern !abo~ f~r a time interval 
of length dt, it succeeds in updating the highest quality in this industry with 
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probability jdt, where a~ > 0 is assumed to take a fixed ·value. The firm that can suc-
ceed ln inventing the highest quality can acquire the patent of the p~oduct with this 
quality, and becomes a leader firm in this industry. Let vN denote .the market value 
of tile leader firm. Then the free entry conditions of the R&ELactivities are: 
'(12) 
,;_;hi~h ~~ans \hat ~N ~· ;;Na~ :holds ~s l~ng ~s j ~ 0. Le~ I(j) denote the labor de-
'·· 1· ·1 '. '•• '. • ;, \I • • , I • . > • _ 
mand for R&D activities in industry j: i.e., I(j) is the sum of I within industry j. 
r .. • .. ! ··-1:.- ,.,,,.' . ; . , . ., . . .. ·. . . , .. · . 
Then the aggregated labor demand for R&D over all industries. is given by 
1:1 "',1' ,·I.,; •I''' ' i .' . • ' • .. , • ' ,' . , ' · 
I .=c,fo1 Mj)_dj. ~t i,~ ~psumed that the labor demand for R&D,is symmetric across in-
dustries s.u10h that I(j) .~ J. This implies that in each industry, the probability for 
tl)e current.lel).der .. t0 ,b,e. overtaken by a,new entrant is.:simply given by Idt for a 
time interval of length dt. 
Once a Northern firm succeeds in inventing the.brand new highest•quality, the 
firnl I determines its location pattern, that is, it determines. Whether. it stays in the 
!'!,orth. ?~ i~ ,~n!'age~. in, FDL Let vR den0te, ,the I)larket value of the leader firm )Vhen 
it, ~l'l\'ag0,s ipiJ?~·" T~roughput J;he p~p~r, we foc'!s, on the case in. which ·the follow, 
~g; ~~l~ti·'\l' qpldp:.J;. 
(13) . 
Eq.,,(l;J) implies that in equilibrium, leader firms are indifferent between staying in 
the North and engaging in FDL 
Finally; •w·e characterize· th'e nd-arbitrage condition. The rio-arbitrage condition 
for the lea<).er firm in the North is given by:101 
'• ' ' r'' ' . -
(14) 
m the,·,al;lOv:_~- ,equat!on, ~tP,e term VN,t'· rep_resents capital ·gains, while the. term ::-ft·vN,i 
shows the expected capital loss that occurs with probability f.dt. Because it is' as-
sume\! ,that the lea,cjer firm can choo.se its location at each .point in' time without any 
cost, the no-arbitrage condition for the leader firr:n locating }n the South is given in 
an af:t~ogous way: 
(15) 
From Eqs. (14) and (15), Eq. (13) means: 
(16) 
., ' 
2.3 · 'Market-clearing condition 
Let'n denote the measure of the leader firm engaging in FDL We ha~e the labor mar-
ket clearing conditions in the .North and the South as follows: 
··-"·' 
10) Recall that r, = p holds for all t ;, 0. 
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(17) 
(18) 
Next, the market-clearing 'condition for the intermediate input is characterized. The 
firms locating in the North can freely buy the intermediate input from the North-
ern market where it is cheaper than it is in the South. Then, their demand for the 
Northern-made input equals their total demand for the input, and this is given by 
(1-n)a~/(A</>(w)wN). On the other hand, because of LCR by the Southern govern-
ment, the firms engaging in FDI can buy only (1- ~~:) X 100% of their demand from 
the Northern market. Because their demand for the component is given by na~(w)/ 
(A<f>(w)wN), the market-clearing condition for the intermediate input inthe North-
ern market becomes: 
(1-n)a~ n(l-~~:)a~(w) z = +--~~~--
N A</>(w)wN A</>(w)wN (19) 
Accordingly, the Southern-made intermediate input is bought only by the firms en-
gaging in FDI, which actually buy" X 100% of their total demand from the South-
ern market. Therefore, the market-clearing condition for the Southern-made interme-
diate input is: 
n~~:a~(w) 
Zs = A</>(w)wN · 
From Eqs. (17) and (19), the resource constraint in the North is given by: 
LN = a~I+ A</>(~)wN [(l-n)¢+n(l-~~:)a~(w)]; ¢=a~+ at"" c(l, 1), · 
(20) 
(21) 
where¢ represents the resulting amount of labor used by a leader firm in the North 
to produce one unit of final goods. The identity ¢ = c(l, 1) is readily shown to 
hold, once we recall that c(wN, wN) = wNat+wNat. 
On the other hand, Eqs. (18) and (20) give the resource constraint in the South: 
Ls = A</>(:)wN [a~(w)+~~:lla~(w)J. (22) 
3. Equilibrium 
In this section, the equilibrium of the economy is characterized. From Eqs. (8), (10), 
(11) and the linear homogeneity of the unit cost function, Eq .. (16) is. rearranged as: 
¢ = c(l-~~:+~~:llw,, w,) V t :2: 0. (23) 
Because the function c( ·, ·) is increasing in each argument, it· is found that the 
. right hand.side of the above equation is increasing with respect tow. Furthermore, be-
cause II > 1, it follows that: 
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= lim c(l-t<+JCOw, w) V t< E [0, 1], 
w-J 
where the inequality ¢ :5: c(1-t<+t<O, 1) holds with equality if and only if t< = 0. 
Thus, from the intermediate value theorem, there uniquely exists w*(t<) E (1/0,1] 
such that it solves Eq. (23) as follows: 
w, = w*(t<)Vt ;o: 0, (24) 
where w1 = 1 if/(; = 0. Because the unit cost function is linearly homogenous, its par-
tial derivatives are homogenous of degree zero. Therefore, once w1 is. determined as 
w*(t<), a~(w) and a~(w) are also given as functions oft< alone as follows: 
a~*(t<) = a~(w*(JC)) = c1(1, l:*(t<)) :5: a~, 
a~*(t<) = a~(w*(~<)) = c2(1, l:*(t<)) ;o: at; !:*(~<) = !:(w*(~<)), 
where a~*(~<) :5: a~ and a~*(~<) ;o: at come from!:*(~<) :5: w*(~<) and the properties 
of the unit cost function: c12 ( ·, ·) > 0 and c22 ( ·, ·) < 0. 
From Eqs. (9) and (24), the charged price by leader firms is found to be: 
PN = PF = :At/>*(t<)wN; t/>*(t<) = tf>(w*(t<)) = c(l, w*(t<)). (25) 
Note that from the definitions of¢ and t/>*(t<), tf>*(t<) :5: ¢, the equality of which 
holds true when t< = 0: i.e., w*(t<) = 1. Substituting Eq. (25) and the fact that qN = 
wN into Eq. (10), the instantaneous profit of the leader firms is found to be: 
(26) 
Hereafter, it is assumed that). is sufficiently large such that). > ¢1¢*(1) > 1. 
Now we are in a position to derive the equilibrium path of the economy. Apply-
ing the above results into Eq. (21): 
I (1-n)¢ n(l-t<)a~*(~<) 
LN =aNI+ :At/>*(t<)WN + :At/>*(t<)wN (27) 
On the other hand, from Eq. (22): 
n ¢-(1-J<)a~*(t<) L - --:---,-:c+'-,---'--:__cc-i--c"-_:__:__ 
S- ).tf>*(J<)WN w*(t<) (28) 
where the following identity is utilized:¢= (1-t<+t<Ow*(t<))a~'(~<)+w'(t<)a~*(t<), 
which comes from the fact that c(qN, wN) = c(qp, w5 ) from Eq. (16) (or Eq. (23)) and 
the definition of the unit cost function. 
We focus on the case in which the free entry /exit condition for R&D is always 
binding: i.e., the first condition of Eq. (12) holds with equality for all t ;o: 0: vN = 
wNa~ for all t ;o: 0. Then, from Eqs. (14), (26), (27) and (28), the following linear ordi-
nary differential equation holds: 
vN.t = (pdN+LN~w*(t<)Ls)vN,,-1. 
aN . 
The above equation constitutes an autonomous dynamic system of this economy. 
This equation implies: 
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Because vN.t is ~ forward-looking variable, the- above result says that the economy 
has no transitional dynamics and vN,t ~ vZCt<) for all t :2: 0. 
Our final task in this section is to derive the other major elidogenous v'ariables 
and check some consistency conditions. Substituting the result that vN,t ~ vZCt<) 
into Eqs. (27) and (28) respectively yields: 
. I,~ I'~t<) = [l-(/>/C!c¢'Ct<))~ CLN+w'Ct<)L 5 ) p(/>/CWC~<)), , 
aN 
and 
Therefore, we have to·check I' Ct<) > 0 and n' Ct<) E CO. 1): Note that 'from Eq. (19), 
ZN > 0 is automatically satisfied if n'Ct<) E CO, 1) . 
. . At first, differentiating 1' Ct<) yields: 
i>tcLN+w'Ct<)L5)/a~+p] d¢'Ct<) [1-(/>/CA¢'(t<))JL5 dw'Ct<) . .. 
icC¢'Ct<)) 2 · ' • dt<' + · · a~·. " · · diC · < 0• 
C29) 
the sign of which holds true from the folloo,ying facts: 
(ew'Cti)-'l)a~'C") · : 
dw'C~<)/dl< ~ z L < 0, 
t<Ba?Ct<) +a,'(t<) 
·d¢'(t<)/dt< ~ c2(1, w'(~<))(dw'(~<)/dl<) < 0. 
Thus ,I' (I<) is a decreasing function of"· meaning that}'(!) > O.must .be satisfied in 
equilibrium. This condition is arranged asL5 > w'(l)''((/>pa~/Cic¢·;(1)-J)-LNi. 
:On the other hand, it is readily found that n'(~<) > 0 for all t<'t= [0,1]. Then, 
in order to understand the condition n'(IC) E (0, 1), we have to. examine when 
n''(IC) < 1 only. Logarithmically differentiating.n'(/c), we have:. 
. . . ·, . . 
dn'(~<)/n'(~<) 
diG/ I<. 
. . 
~<a~'(!C) ( ( . da~~(~<)/d") 1- 1-IC) .. 
(/>-,-0-:IC)q:~'(~<) . · · .. a~'(~<) 
+ ~<(d~'·~"jj'l") +(1 ., J. ·w'(~<)Ls · ) t<(dw'·~")jd~) < O, 
· · ·" · · · · paN+ LN+w*(!C)L5 · w '" 
. ' ' (30) 
the sign of which is shown to be true from d,w* (t<)/ diG < ·a. d¢' c/C); d~ < 0 and . 
Then, in equilibrium, n' (0) < 1 must be met. This condition is rewritten as 
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Es .< at.CL"ct-pa~)/(A<fi-at) ."1 If LN is- sufficiently large and p is sufficiently 
smal!, .. the set qf L 8 ·is not empty where both n' (0) < 1 and 1'(1) > 0 are satisfied. 
Th.en,. we-:can:state .the following proposition: 
Proposition.!. .Suppose that Ls )> w'(l)c'[(fipa~/Oc<P'(l)-(fi)-LN] and Ls< at 
(L.,rhp'a~)!CA<fi-c:at) are satisfied. Then, there uniquely. exists an:equilibrium of the 
econpmy with ·endogenous· innovation, FDI, LCR and without transitional dynamics. 
4; ,Effects!of.LCR , .. 
,.,. f, ' ' ,;. 
4.1 . Effects •on innovation, FDI and intermediate input sector· 
From, tbe' -an'a1yses in the previous section, we can immediately arrive at the follow-
ing.le:rrtma:: 'f,, -~, ·\ ~ . ;. , . :• .. 
Le)1J.Il)a· 1.• Jlhe reinforcement. (relaxation) of LCR by the Southern ·government re' 
duces.(prort<0tes).FDiand innovatiowin the North. 
Proof This lemma• is .shown to be true from Eqs. (29) and. (30). • •• 
•· '·'The-mechanism generating this lemma is as--follows. In this model, a reducing 
LCR, (a decrease .in,.,) ,by the Southern government has four main· effects on the re-
source constraint in the North: the compulsory-resource allocating effect, the compo-
nents"ihtensification ·effect, the .. price effect and the .FDI-inducing effect.- To grasp 
h6w these.effects affect .innovation in the North, we· differentiate Eqs. (27), (14) with 
v9 ·"'· 0, .andr (28) .to obtain: 
11) To prove this, we can utilize the facts that w'(O) ~ 1 (from Eq. 23), ¢'(0) ~ c(l, !) ~if, 
and t*(O) = 1, the last of which means a~*(O) =a~, a~*(O) =at. 
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These expressions clearly show how each of the aforementioned four effects af-
fect innovation through the resource constraint in the North. In Eq. (31), the first 
term represents the sum of the compulsory-resource allocating effect and the compo-
nents-intensification effect, where the former is captured by a~*(~<) and the latter 
by (1-J<)(da~·(~)/d~<). These two effects are found to jointly reduce innovation if 
LCR is relaxed. This is because as LCR is relaxed, the firms engaging in FDI pur-
chase more intermediate input from the North (the compulsory-resource allocating ef-
fect), and each firm uses the intermediate input more intensively (the components-
intensification effect).'2l 
On the other hand, the second term captures the price effect. From the endoge-
nous location choice of leader firms, relaxing LCR has upward pressure on the wage 
rate in the South (dw'(J<)/dJ<. < 0), because Eq. (23) rimst·be met. This makes the 
marginal cost of follower firms increase, which is transmitted to a leader firm's 
charging price through its limit pricing strategy. Because the output of final goods 
is given by the inverse of the price, reducing LCR can positively affect innovation ac-
tivities in the North. This effeCt is captured by the term ¢; (~<) < 0. Froni Eq. (32); 
however, the price effect also has a negative impact on innovation through a kind ·.of 
general equilibrium effect. In this model, innovation causes an increase in the capital 
loss, because of being overtaken by the new leader firms. This implies that the wage 
rate in the North declines through the free entry /exit condition for innovation activi-
ties. This may make the ·charged price lower, which in turn may reduce innovation. 
This effect is captured by dv;, which is affected by dl*. Thus, the price effect on inno-
vation is ambiguous. 
Finally, the third term represents the FDI-inducing effect. By a close look at 
Eq. (33), it is found that this effect emerges from the resource constraint in the 
South and the aforementioned three effects. The first term of Eq. (33) is the direct ef-
fect of reducing LCR on FDI: a decrease in" makes it more profitable for firms to en-
gage in FDI. The second term is the sum of the compulsory-resource allocating ef-
fect and the components-intensification effect. Note that this effect has an impact on 
the resource constraint in the South opposite to that in the North. As LCR is re-
laxed, the firms engaging in FDI purchase the intermediate input from the North, 
meaning that this makes the labor used for the production of final goods in the 
South more abundant. This promotes FDI by the Northern firms. The third effect is 
the price effect. 
Obviously, substituting Eqs. (32) and (33) into Eq. (31) yields Eq. (29), and substi-
tuting the result back into (33) yields Eq. (30). Thus, we can now conclude that the re-
sult obtained in Eq. (29) shows that the FDI-inducing effect outweighs the other ef-
fects, which possibly have opposite effects on innovation. 
The above discussions explain one reason why the Northern government wants 
12) To see why, recall a~*(x:)/dx: < 0. 
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the Southern one to liberalize foreign investment. On the other hand, the following 
lemma shows that from the Southern government's point of view, maintaining LCR 
plays a role in protecting the domestic intermediate input industry. 
Lemma 2. Suppose that/C ~ 0: i.e., the Southern government abolishesLCR and the in-
termediate input is freely traded between the North and the South. Then, the interme-
diate input. sector in the South shuts down and hence all final goods firms purchase 
the input from the Northern intermediate input sector. 
Proof Substituting the results obtained in the preceding section into Eq. (20): 
/Ca~'(IC) 
Zs ~ z; (IC) "' w' (IC)Ls. 
. ¢- (1-IC)a~'(IC) 
Substituting w'(O) ~I, a~'(O) ~a~' and ¢*(0) ~¢into this, it .is easily verified 
that z;C") ·~ o if"~ 0. Then, in order to prove this lemma, it is sufficient to-show 
that Z5 = 0 is consistent with the intermediate good firms' profit maximization: i.e., 
we have only to check that the first condition of Eq. (7) holds with strict inequality. 
If the input is freely traded, qN ~ q5 ~ q must be met. On the other hand, w*(IC) ~ l 
if""== 0, which implies Ws ~ WN. Then, q ~ WN < ewN "holds, which means that the 
first condition of Eq. (7) holds with strict inequality and hence the intermediate in-
put sector in the South could earn a negative profit if it operates. • 
Thus, Lemma I and Lemma 2 seemingly suggest that there is .a conflict between 
the Northern and Southern governments concerning whether or not to relax and/or 
abolish LCR. The Northern government, in order to promote domestic innovation ac-
tivities, wants to continue the process of investment liberalization, whereas the South-
ern government wants to protect domestic industry that otherwise will decline as a di-
rect result of the abolishment of LCR. However, the results obtained here do not 
really help us to judge whether strengthening LCR is beneficial or harmful for the 
South, because we have not presented any welfare implications yet. The next subsec-
tion therefore investigates the welfare implication of LCR. 
4.2 Welfare effects' 
Because the economy has no transitional dynamics, the lifetime utility (1) is now re-
written as: 
U; ~ ! [ln E;_0- ln(?.¢'(")wN.oll + .C(tn?. j, 1 m,(j)dj)exp( -pt)dt, (34) 
where the first term is the utility from the quantity of consumption, while the sec-
ond term captures utility from the quality of consumption. The first term, in turn, de-
pends positively on the household's expenditure (or income), but negatively on the 
price. Thus, the welfare effect of reducing LCR can be decomposed into the 
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following .three. effects: the growth effect, the income effect and the price effect. 
From Eqs. (3) and (4), the expenditure is given as the following well known form: 
E,,o = pAi.o + wi,o· 
Because the asset market equilibrium implies LNAN.o+LsAs.o = v*(~<), and country 
i 's i'nitial' share of asset holdings is given as the initial condition, we Can set ·1Jo E 
(0, 1) X 100% of equities to be held by the Northern households without any' toss of 
generality: i.e., LNAN.o == n0v'(K). Using this, the expenditure of the representative 
consumer in the North and the South, EiJ and E8 , is reSpectively: 
EN,o = (pa~n,!LN+I)v*(K)/a~. 
Es.o = [p~~(l-n,)/L8+w'(K)]v~(K)/a~. 
On the other hand, J;' m,(j)dj in the second term of Eq. (34) is the sum of the 
number of events (innovation) that have occurred up'to timet in all industries. Be-
'cause the measure of iildustry is unity, this can be viewed also as the sample me·aii. 
From the Jaw of large numbers, this is :equal to an expected amount of innovation 
that will occur up to time.t.in an industry .. In other words: 
J;' fh 1(j)dj = J;' f*(K)dt ~ f*(K)!. 
Substituting ~he abov~ results into Eq. (34) yields welfare in the North a~d Sou~h as 
follow~: 
"~ ;N=! {tn[pa~n0/LN+l]-l~if>*(K)~tnHl~A I*(K>}. 
~s = ! {tn[pa~(l-n,)/Ls+w'(K)]- In 9'>'(K)- In >l+ ~~A I*(K)J., . 
Differentiating UN and Us with respect to " yields: 
' ' '· .. . . ' '' ' - . . ' 
dUN,=_!_( In A. dl*(K) .. 1 .. dif>~.(J<).) 
dk. p p dJ< , q'!'(J<) dK ' 
. ' . ' . . ' ' . 
(35) 
':. 
_d_U._s = _d_UN~+'"-:-"--':' :CL.fls(_::P----,--:--:--~do::W::.,';"(=") , 
dK dK p(1-n0)a~+<!>*0K)l.,s dK 
(36). 
Because dw* (~<)I dK < 0, Eqs. (35) .and (36) i9intly· say that dU8/dK < 0 if dUN/ di<. < .0, 
which is summarized as: 
Lemma 3. If the welfare of Northern households improves by relaxation of LCR, then 
the welfare of Southern households necessarily improves. 
Then, based on this.result, let us hereafter consider the possibility that both coun-
tries arrive at an agreement to relax LCR (decrease fi): i.e., ~elaxing LCR is Pareto im-
proving. From Lemma 3, dU,;! dJ<:<. O.is the sufficie11t condition for relaxing LCR-to 
be so. 
Taking a close look.at Eq. (35), it is found thatthe income effect and the.price ef-
fect combine to .be negative for the ·Northern repres~ntative consumer. Thus, we 
Innovation, foreign direct investment and local content requirement 51 
have to examiriil-when the growth effect dominates such a negative effect. Substitut-
ing Eq. (29) and d</J*(~<)/d~<, we have: 
dUN= J_[ar(~<)+ InA ( 1 ¢ ) •( ) J dw*(~<)/d" (37) d" p pa~ A</J" (~<) w " Ls w* (~<) ; 
( ) _ InA ¢ ( LN+w*(~<)Ls) r " =-A- <P* (~<) 1+ pa~ -!, 
' '·''. 
where a =,we,(!, w)/c(l, w) E (0, I) equals the labor share. Hereafter, a is as-
sumed to be constaht.13l From Eq: (37), it is found that dUN/d" < 0 if f(lc) >b. Fur-
,r.", :. !. ··. . . -•' , , ·. 
thermore, if the value,of a is sufficiently large, f(~<) is an increasing function of"· 
Thus:· the suHicient condition for dUN/ d1< "< 0 to hold is given by f( 0) '> 0, which' is 
' ' rewr'i~ten t B.s(' 
':I ·'! ,., •. 
( 
LN+Ls) 
, ,.ln A 1+ .. 'p/!N' > A. 
Now; we'can•state the following proposition: 
•'i : ,. 'f. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the two assumptions in Proposition 1 are satisfied, and 
ih'at a' is ;.ufficiently large. Then, a relaxation of LCR is Pareto improping if 
f(O) > 0. 
5. Concluding remarks 
; \ I 
Many developing countries have been obliged to eliminate a range of restrictions on 
foreign' investment;· and they seem to be afraid that to do so will damage their.domes-
tic industries. Whether 'or not to ab~li~h LCR is a t;picitl example of such a prob, 
' .'I • ,, • _- ' "' .... ' 
!em. This paper constructed a North-South quality-ladder m0del where FDI is endoge-
!liiusly d~ter111\ned and is affected by such an investment measure, and giv~s a hypo-
theti~al ;,',;sw~~ to this proble;,. This paper showed that once the endogenous loca-
tion t:hdice and ihn:ova:tion are 'e'xplic~tlY incorp~fated into 'the ge~eral equiliprium 
1\lo~el, w)lich has been oyerloo.ked in the existing literature on LCR, reducing LCR 
can raise welfare not orily in the North but also in the South. Thus, this result can 
give ii rationa:Ie f~r·~scqmrpending tha~ de.velopiri..g cOuntries ~iberalize foreigll invest-
. ' . .. . . ' ' 
ment .. 
To analytically examine .the problem of LCR in a dynamic general equilibrium 
·frB..ffieWOr'~; th).S ~~P~'r _makes. some restrictive· ass,umption~. First.- the .nonexi~tence 
of any fixed costs for firms to engage in FDI rules out transitional dynamics. Al-
though this facilitates a simple analytical examination of the welfare effects of 
LCR, fixed costs are likely to be present in reality. Second, in order to focus on 
13) Thus, we assume the unit cost function c(q, w) to be {fiq 1-awa. 
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firms' location choice, this paper assumes away any trade barriers such as transporta-
tion costs. Thus, this paper should be seen as a benchmark case against future policy-
oriented papers. 
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